The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) aims to increase competition and to foster client protection in the European …nancial market. Among other provisions, it abolishes the concentration rule and challenges the market power of existing trading venues. The directive introduces venue competition in order to achieve better execution and ultimately lower trading costs. In this paper I address the question of whether fostering competition between alternative trading venues alone may or not be able to impact actual competition in the market. I consider two reasons for why it may not: direct network e¤ects together with increasing returns to scale, and post-trading constraints. In particular, I (a) evaluate the actual degree of competition between trading venues, (b) measure the impact of network e¤ects on competition, and lastly (c) assess the barriers to competition induced by post-trading constraints. The results imply that …nancial intermediaries tend to value liquidity more (than total fees) when deciding where to route a given order for execution -implying that being the incumbent venue translates into a competitive advantage. Furthermore, eliminating the mentioned barriers to competition seems to be asociated with a signi…cant decrease (of a similar magnitude) in the assymetry of the industry.
INTRODUCTION
The interaction between competition and economic growth is a well established fact in the literature (Porter (1990) , Aghion and Howitt (1992) , Blundell et al. (1995 ), Aghion et al. (1999 ). Competition impacts economic growth via a more e¢ cient allocation of market resources that contributes to "better economic performance, better prices and better services for consumers and businesses" (Kroes (2007) ).
The last years have witnessed a strong and ferocious promotion of competition in a large spectrum of markets and industries and a clear example of this trend is the new Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) that fosters a fair, competitive, transparent, e¢ cient and integrated European …nancial market.
To this end, MiFID aims -among other objectives -to harmonize the trading structures across the Member States by abolishing the requirement to concentrate the execution of trading orders by …nancial intermediaries in a single venue.
The above principle challenges the market power of existing venues and fosters entry by new players. This paper argues that fostering potential competition in the cash trading market may not have an impact on the degree of actual competition. In particular, I consider two reasons for why it may not: (a) direct network e¤ects together with increasing returns to scale and (b) post-trading constraints.
MiFID determines that the choice of trading venue by …nancial intermediaries must achieve best execution to their clients. Best execution coincides with the venue that achieves the best price at a lower cost, which means that the choice of …nancial intermediaries must take into account not only factors related to the explicit trading costs (execution, settlement and clearing fees), but also factors connected with the implicit trading costs (price and liquidity).
Implicit trading costs are important as cash trading exhibits direct network e¤ects.
The valuation of …nancial intermediaries for a given trading venue is increasing in the number of other agents that choose the same venue -as it increases the probability of an order …nd a corresponding counterparty.
This fact raises the problem that in the presence of network e¤ects, fostering com- To this end, I suggest a structural discrete-choice multinomial random-coe¢ cients logit demand model for trading following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) that takes into account the trade-o¤ between explicit and implicit trading costs following Pagano (1989) . The model is ‡exible in the sense that the implied substitution patterns do not su¤er from the problem of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property characteristic of more standard models. Furthermore, following the demand modelling literature, the error term is structurally embedded in the model and thereby circumvents the critique provided by Brown and Walker (1989) related to the addition of add-hoc errors and their induced correlations. The results imply that …nancial intermediaries tend to value liquidity more (than total fees) when deciding where to route a given order for execution. For this reason the incumbent venue has a clear advantage relatively to its competitors and can as a result exert market power when setting total fees.
After estimating the degree of substitutability between the di¤erent trading venues, I analyze the impact of network e¤ects as a barrier to competition, by computing the counterfactual market shares that would arise if there were no liquidity di¤erences across venues. Lastly I propose a measure of the barriers to competition induced by the bundle of trading and post-trading services by simulating the equilibrium market shares that would arise if the services of di¤erent trading services were fungible. In both cases, the results suggest that eliminating the corresponding barrier to competition is asociated with a signi…cant decrease (of a similar magnitude) in the assymetry of the industry. The paper proceeds as follows. The economics of trading is described in section 2, whereas in section 3 I discuss the relevant literature. Section 4 presents the demand model and establishes estimation issues. In section 5, I introduce the data, discuss identi…cation and present the results. Section 6 discusses network e¤ects and posttrading constraints as barriers to competition. Section 7 concludes.
THE ECONOMICS OF TRADING AND MiFID
The process of trade starts with investors sending their buying or selling orders to a broker or a broker-dealer. If investors choose the former, the broker receives the order and can decide by one of two options: (a) can place it directly on a trading venue order book or (b) can decide to go indirectly via a dealer. If the broker opts for option (b) or the investors send their orders directly to a broker-dealer then the dealer (or broker-dealer depending on the case) can match the order from its own inventory, place the order on a trading venue or go to another dealer. The process of trading involving an electronic trading platform is illustrated in Figure I . The paper focuses on trading venue competition and for that reason models the choice of venue to execute an order by brokers, dealers and broker-dealers (henceforth …nancial intermediaries).
At …rst sight, the market for trading in Europe seems not to be extremely concentrated for an industry with strong network e¤ects and scale economies -if you consider the set of all European securities, the volume market share of the leading trading venue is roughly 30% with the top 3 venues capturing approximately 60% of the market. However these statistics are somehow misleading as typically trading for a given security is concentrated on a smaller set of trading venues. If you consider the set of the FTSE 100 securities, the market share for the leading trading venue is now roughly 70% with the top 3 venues capturing approximately 98% of the market! Table I presents a range of concentration ratios for di¤erent sets of European equities.
On this respect, MiFID tries to promote a signi…cant change in the shape of the industry. It aims to increase competition by creating a common harmonized European market for …nancial products and to foster client protection through improved transparency, suitability requirements and best execution principles. In particular, it abolishes the so-called "concentration rule" that allowed, in the past, member states to impose that securities admitted to trading on a regulated market have to be traded only on regulated markets. The MiFID allows, in contrast, the provision of trading services to a variety of trading venues, namely Regulated Markets (RM), Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF) and Systematic Internalizers (SI).
RM or MTF are entities that o¤er multilateral trading for …nancial instruments (such as an order book), with slightly di¤erent standards applying to each, whereas SI refer to …nancial …rms which, on an organized, frequent and systematic basis, deal on own account by executing client orders outside a RM or an MTF.
A …nancial intermediary wanting to trade a given security is therefore faced with a choice -it must choose a venue where to route the order to RM like the London Underestimating the importance of network e¤ects can often lead to a dismal failure. As an illustration consider the case of Jiway, a pan-European trading platform for The data suggests that segmentation maybe in fact an issue in this market and as a result the concentration ratios presented maybe even higher if certain characteristics of the orders -like size -are taken into consideration. In order to evaluate the actual degree of competition between trading venues, the empirical framework must be able to deal with eventual segmentation of the market. In the discussion above, I present arguments that sustain that barriers to venue competition may exist even after MiFID. As a last note, I would like to point that if actual competition can have a extremely positive e¤ect, it may also have a negative one: a fragmentation e¤ect. When di¤erent trading venues coexist, markets become fragmented and the liquidity available in any one setting is reduced, thereby potentially limiting any market's ability to provide stable prices. The bid-ask spreads might be greater and daily securities returns might have a larger variance. Moreover, as liquidity facilitates the crucial price discovery role of markets, as order ‡ow fragments, the ability of prices to aggregate information can be reduced, and with it the e¢ ciency of the market.
MiFID addresses this point by requiring every venue not only to publish the price, volume and time of a transaction as close to real-time as possible, but also to do it in a way that is easily accessible to other market participants. Furthermore, it also consolidates the hitherto fragmented market of European over-the-counter (OTC) securities.
For these reasons, the fragmentation issues of increased trading venue competition may be less signi…cant for MiFID. 
RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature on market dominance begins with Gilbert and Newbery (1982) and Reinganum (1983) Shapiro (1985) and from then on it has developed along two di¤erent directions. Katz and Shapiro (1994), Economides (1996) , Shy (2001), and Farrell and Klemperer (2006) provide an excellent overview of this literature. One of the strands of the literature tries to empirically measure the e¤ect of network e¤ects, whereas the other studies its
implications. In what concerns the second source of market dominance, competition between trading and post-trading services has been modelled by Tapking and Yang (2004) and Koppl and Monnet (2003) . The former studies di¤erent forms of industry structures between venues and post-trading …rms, whereas the latter analyzes the impact of integrating the two services.
A number of papers have explicitly studied venue competition. The seminal work is from Hamilton (1979) who establishes the two opposite e¤ects of multi-venue trading and reports empirical estimates of the e¤ect of o¤-boarding trading on liquidity and volatility of NYSE stocks. Multi-venue trading promotes lower explicit trading costs via higher competition but also has a fragmentation e¤ect. When di¤erent trading venues coexist, markets become fragmented and the liquidity available in any one setting is reduced, thereby potentially limiting any market's ability to provide stable prices. The bid-ask spreads might be greater and daily securities returns might have a larger variance.
Moreover, as liquidity facilitates the crucial price discovery role of markets, as order ‡ow fragments, the ability of prices to aggregate information can be reduced, and with it the e¢ ciency of the market. Hamilton …nds that the competitive e¤ect exceeds the fragmentation e¤ect, and that both e¤ects are small.
In general, followers of Hamilton's legacy use a reduced-form strategy that regress spreads and liquidity on stock and market characteristics that include a competition variable. More recent examples include Weston (2002) and Gresse (2006) . Weston 
DEMAND FOR TRADING
The trading decision can be decomposed in two stages. First, investors decide the order characteristics and send it to an …nancial intermediaries to be executed. Second, after receiving the order the intermediary decides the trading venue where to execute it, conditional on the order characteristics received. In this paper, I take the …rst stage as given and propose to model the second stage choice by …nancial intermediaries. An interesting and natural extension will be the incorporation of the …rst-stage into the model framework.
Consider that in period t = 1; : : : ; T an investor sends an order with characteristics k (including e.g. the code of the security, the direction and the volume to be traded)
to …nancial intermediary i = 1; : : : ; I for her to execute. After receiving the order, the …nancial intermediary has choose the trading venue where to execute the order subject to her internal best execution policy that, under MiFID, had to have been previously accepted by the investor.
The best execution policy de…nes the intermediary's commitment towards the investor to achieve the best possible result for their clients taking into account price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order. An alternative view for the intermediary's best execution policy is to think of it as an auction where the intermediary allocates the order across the alternative trading venues according to an allocation rule known to the investor but unknown to the econometrician.
I propose to estimate the allocation rule by specifying a structural multinomial random-coe¢ cients logit discrete-choice demand model for trading following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) where in each period t heterogeneous …nancial intermediaries i consider to execute an order with characteristics k in a trading venue v = 0; 1; : : : ; V;
where v = 0 denotes the outside option of executing the order over-the-counter.
I assume the best execution policy rule score that …nancial intermediary i obtains from executing an order of characteristics k at venue v in period t to be of the form
where w kvt represents a vector of attributes for the order, venue and time period, and p ikvt denotes the all-in explicit trading costs faced by the …nancial intermediary, which include execution, clearing and settlement fees. Because the fees schedules are typically a function of intermediary i's trading pro…le 1 during a certain time period as well as of subset of order characteristics, the explicit trading costs p ikvt are indexed by i and k: In order to explicitly illustrate the non-linearity of the fees schedules, I will denote
, where z i expresses the intermediary i's trading pro…le. Lastly, …nancial intermediaries heterogeneity in their allocation rule for trading venues enters the conditional indirect utility through intermediary-speci…c valuation i of the di¤erent elements included in the best execution policy and an additive preference shock " ikvt :
Among the attributes of a trading venue, w kvt ; that impact the choice of intermediaries are the implicit trading costs b kvt as cash trading exhibits network e¤ects and participants value liquidity. Although there is no uncontroversial de…nition of liquidity, the negative correlation between liquidity and implicit trading costs is generally accepted. A large installed base of intermediaries trading at venue v promotes lower implicit trading costs as it (a) stabilizes the market price of a security, and (b) reduces the extent to which placing an order has an adverse e¤ect on the corresponding price.
As a side note, these network e¤ects can be arti…cially reinforced by fees schedules that are decreasing in trade volume.
Following Davis (2006) and Chen et al. (2007) , u ( ) is assumed to be of the form
where:
(a) the vector of characteristics w kvt is split between the implicit trading costs b kvt ; a K-dimensional vector of observables, x kvt , and a vector of unobserved (to the econometrician) characteristics, whose mean valuation for orders with characteristics k executed in venue v in period t across …nancial intermediaries is given by kvt ;
(b) The increasing function i b kvt captures the network e¤ects, where i 0 is the parameter that controls the strength of those network e¤ects;
(c) and i denotes the parameters of estimation:
For completeness, the …nancial intermediary can also choose to execute the order over-the-counter. The conditional indirect utility from the outside option is assumed to 1 Volume discounts can re ‡ect venue economies of scale that are passed to agents.
be u ik0t = k0t + " ik0t : Following the literature, I will normalize without loss of generality k0t = 0 as due to the ordinality of utility, only kvt k0t matters for the intermediary's choice of venue.
The parameters of estimation i , i and i are indexed by intermediary in order to capture the fact that the valuations of the di¤erent elements in the allocation rule can depend on intermediaries'characteristics. In particular, I will allow those parameters to be a function of the intermediaries'trading pro…les
where o denote coe¢ cients that will express the heterogeneity of intermediaries in ref-
erence with their trading pro…le. As a result, the parameters to be estimated reduce to
After substituting equation (3) into the conditional indirect utility function (1), it is possible to summarize the …nancial intermediary's conditional indirect utility as a sum of two terms: a …rst term that is common across intermediaries, kvt = b kvt +x 0 kvt + kvt , and a second term, ikvt + " ikvt ; that introduces intermediary heterogeneity
where
As p ijvt will typically vary by the …nancial intermediary's trading pro…le, so will ijvt :
Following European Commission (2006), the following pro…les could be considered: (a) typical volume and value trades' intermediary, (b) large volume of low value trades' intermediary, (c) large volume of high value trades'intermediary, and (d) small volume of low value trades'intermediary.
I model …nancial intermediaries as making myopic decisions or equivalently to have static expectations about the future based on the fact that the best execution policy has to be applied on a trade by trade case.
Given the heterogeneity of the …nancial intermediaries speci…ed in the model, the solution to the maximization problem of the best execution policy rule score over all the di¤erent venues will vary from one intermediary to another, depending on their speci…c attributes (z i ; " ikt ) where " ikt = (" ik0t ; : : : ; " ikV t ). As a result, conditional on the order characteristics, the set of …nancial intermediaries that execute the order to trade at venue v in period t is then A kvt (x t ; p t ; t ; ) = f(z i ; " ik0t ; : : : ; " ikV t ) ju ikvt > u ikgt 8g s.t. v 6 = gg ;
where x t ; p t and t are the vectors of observed characteristics, explicit trading costs and deltas. If the preference shock " ikvt follows an i.i.d. extreme value distribution, the probability that intermediary i opts for venue v to execute order with characteristics k in period t is then given by the following multinomial logit type expression
Integrating over the distribution of intermediaries'speci…c attributes and order characteristics (z i ; k) yields market-level share for venue v in each period t s vt (x t ; p t ; t ; ) =
where P (z; k) denotes the population joint distribution function of the intermediary types and order characteristics (z i ; k), not necessarily independent.
Identi…cation and Estimation Procedure
I now proceed with a description of the procedure to estimate the parameter vector = ( ; ; o ) 0 : The data available to the researcher is crucial for the estimation procedure. In what follows, I will assume that a known joint distribution of the intermediary types and order characteristics is available. However, the procedure can easily be modi…ed for the case where that distribution is unavailable and one distribution needs to be assumed, incorporating into the utility speci…cation its unknown parameters, to be estimated jointly with the other parameters of the model.
The estimation algorithm encompasses four steps that I now describe.
Step One Set initial values for the mean utilities, t , and for the parameters of estimation, .
Step Two Approximate the predicted market-level shares. The key di¢ culty with the random-coe¢ cients multinomial logit model has to do with the fact that no closed form expression exists for the integral that de…nes those predicted shares s vt (x t ; p t ; t ; ) = Z Avt e kvt + ikvt 1 + P q e kqt + ikqt dP (z; k) :
As the computation of the above expression is, in general, problematic, the literature follows Pakes (1986), Pakes and Pollard (1989), and McFadden (1989) and approximates that intractable integral by a simulation estimator. In what the particular choice of the simulation estimator is concerned, the smooth simulator has been the prevailing approach. To compute it, ns pseudo-random vectors of unobserved intermediary attributes (z r 1 ; : : : ; z r ns ) and order characteristics (k r 1 ; : : : ; k r ns ) are drawn from dP (z; k), and, given the initial values of t and ; used to obtain kvt + r ikvt where
The smooth estimator that simulates the aggregate market shares is, then, given by s vt (x t ; p t ; t ; ; P ns ) = 1 ns
where P ns denotes the empirical distribution of the simulation draws. Please note that this estimator, in contrast with other simulation estimators 2 , by integrating the "'s analytically, circumvents the need to draw them and, consequently, limits the simulation error to the sampling process. It is also instrumental in obtaining simulated market-level shares that are smooth functions, positive and sum to one.
As a …nal note I would like to stress, as Berry, Linton, and Pakes (2004) 
that the introduction of simulation error in ‡uences the asymptotic distribution of the estimator and, therefore, needs to be explicitly taken it account. On this subject please see step four below.
Step Three Estimate the econometric error, jvt , as a function of the parameters of estimation . The mean utility jvt can not be solved for analytically, but Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) proved that, for a given , the mapping of values of jvt into themselves is a contraction mapping with modulus less than one, and therefore that it is possible to solve for the unique jvt that matches the simulated market-level shares, s jvt (x; p t ; t ; ; P ns ) with the observed ones, s n jvt ; for all j and t, recursively,
as the iterations converge geometrically to the unique …xed point, where the simulated market-level shares s jvt (x t ; p t ; t ; ; P ns ) have to be computed at every new iterated k t : Denote the …xed point by jvt (s n t ; ; P ns ) where s n t represents the vector of observed aggregate market shares.
Given the unique …xed point, it is relatively straithforward to obtain an estimate of the econometric error as a function of the data, x; p t ; s t ; the parameters of estimation, ; and the simulation process, P ns ; jvt (s n t ; ; P ns ) = jvt (s
Step Four Estimate the parameters : Typically, the estimation procedure relies on an identifying restriction over the distribution of the true econometric error, obtained by evaluating equation (12) at n = ns = 1; that is, jvt (s 1 t ; ; P 1 ) :
An econometric issue with the above estimation procedure relates to an eventual correlation between trading costs and the econometric error term. This correlation is expected as trading costs typically incorporate some information that the econometrician does not possess and, thereby, has to include in the econometric error term. Due to this eventual correlation, instrumental variables techniques are, therefore, required. I assume, however, as it is standard in the literature, the unobserved characteristics to be mean independent of the observed ones (please see Berry, 1994) .
I follow the literature and aim to identify the parameters of the model by applying GMM to the below population moment condition,
where jvt denotes the unobserved (to the econometrician) valuation of instrument j at venue v in period t. Please note that other identifying restrictions would also enable the estimation of the model. In particular, given the typical panel structure of the data, an alternative assumption could incorporate the likelihood of the econometric error and the set of instruments to be more similar for a given brand across time, than for those of di¤erent brands. Please see Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Davis (2006) for a more detailed analysis on this subject.
The above population moment conditions can be used, akin to Hansen (1982) , to render a method of moments estimator of ; by interacting the estimated econometric error with the set of instruments, and search for the value of the parameters, , that set the sample analogues of the moment conditions as closed as possible to zero. Let G n;ns ( ) denote the sample analogues of the moment conditions,
Formally, the method of moments estimator,^ ; is therefore the argument that minimizes the weighted norm criterion of G n;ns ( ) ; for some weighting matrix A n with rank at least equal to the dimension of , = arg min kG n;ns ( )k An = G n;ns ( ) 0 A n G n;ns ( ) :
The strong non-linearity of the objective function requires a minimization routine.
The standard practice in the literature has been to use either the Nelder-Mead (1965) nonderivative "simplex" search method or a quasi-Newton method with an analytic gradient (see Press at al., 1994) . The latter has the important (computational) advantage of being two orders of magnitude faster than the former. However, because the …rst method is more robust and less sensitive to starting values, I will perform the search using the Nelder-Mead (1965) nonderivative "simplex" search.
The non-linear search over can be simpli…ed by making use of the fact that the …rst order conditions for a minimum of kG n;ns ( )k An are linear for the subset 1 = ( ; ) of the parameters of estimation, = ( 1 ; u ) : Consequently, it is possible, given the standard instrumental variables results, to express 1 as function of u ; and limit the non-linear search over u ;
where Q denotes the matrix of trading costs and observed characteristics; Z denotes the matrix of instruments; and, …nally, denotes the matrix of mean utilities; expressed only in terms of u after concentrating out 1 :
5 EMPIRICAL APPLICATION In what the implicit trading costs is concerned, e¤ective spreads were computed.
The e¤ective spread is de…ned as the di¤erence between the transaction price and the current mid-quote for time period t,
where M jt is the quoted mid-point, i.e. (A jt + B jt )=2; A jt denotes the ask price, B jt the bid price, and P jt the e¤ective transaction price of instrument j in period t. This measure takes into account the fact that trades can occur either inside or outside the quoted spread. Therefore, it incorporates both the impacts of market spreads and market impact on trading costs, even if it does not allow the separation of the two e¤ects.
Microstructure literature has shown that the e¤ective spread re ‡ects expected losses to informed traders (Glosten and Milgrom(1985) , Copeland and Galai (1983) ), inventory costs (Stoll (1978) , Amihud and Mendelson (1980) , Ho and Stoll (1981) ) and order processing costs (Stoll (1985) ).
I follow Stoll (2000) and Jain (2001) and median the di¤erent variables at a weekly frequency to reduce measurement errors due to random daily ‡uctuations. Table IV presents Figure IV 
Demand Identi…cation
Total fees are typically set taking into account some information that the researcher does not possess and, thereby, has to include in the econometric error term. Furthermore, e¤ective spreads are the outcome of unobserved information to the researcher. As a result, those fees and spreads are expected to be correlated with the error term and instrumental variables techniques are required. The use of securities-and venue speci…c dummy variables decreases the requirements on the instruments needed for a consistent estimation. However, it does not eliminate completely the need for them, as both fees and spreads are likely to still be correlated with unobserved time-speci…c deviations from the overall mean valuations.
In the lines of Arellano and Bond (1991) , and Arellano and Bover (1995) I use 
Demand Function Estimates
The …rst set of results, presented in Table V , correspond to the random-coe¢ cients multinomial logit demand model. The demand speci…cation includes total fees and e¤ective spread variables as observed attributes whereas unobserved attributes were partly taken into account by the inclusion of security, venue and week dummy variables.
The log transformation of the total fees variable was used to reduce skeweness.
The coe¢ cients on fees and liquidity are allowed to be intermediary speci…c in order to capture the fact that the valuations of the di¤erent elements in the allocation rule can depend on intermediaries'characteristics. In particular, I will allow those parameters to be a function of the intermediaries'trading pro…les
where o i denotes the log transformation of order size from intermediary i -drawn 3 from the Chi-X, LSE and SI order books, v i is a 3 1 vector of random-variables drawn from a normalized multivariate normal distribution, is a 3 1 matrix of order size coe¢ cients, and is a 3 3 diagonal matrix that scales the e¤ect of v i . Table V reports the estimated GMM results. The …rst column reports the estimates of the di¤erent coe¢ cient's means, whereas the other columns present estimates of their heterogeneity.
The results suggest that the coe¢ cients are of the expected sign with market shares reacting negatively to total fees and liquidity as we can infer from the corresponding predicted distribution of the institution-speci…c valuations plotted in Figure V . Most of the heterogeneity is due to order sizes as the magnitude of the coe¢ cients on the unobserved intermediary' characteristics (v i ) are of a small magnitude. Furthermore, intermediaries with higher order sizes tend to be more sensitive to both fees and liquidity.
3 I sampled 500 intermediaries per week and security. In order to evaluate the impact of both fees and spreads on market shares, ownand cross-price elasticities were computed for both variables. In the top part of the table, the results suggest that all venues enjoy a certain degree of market power as intermediaries tend to have a low price sensitivity -for the given set of bid-ask spreads in the market. A one percent decrease in the total fees of the venues are estimated to impact only marginally the respective market shares. A possible justi…cation may lie on the network e¤ects that characterize the industry. As intermediaries value both low cost and high liquidity, a decrease in the total fees of a given venue may not be su¢ cient to induce a change of venue.
In the bottom part of the table, the results point to the important role of liquidity on the choice of venue. For the given set of total fees in the market, a one percent increase in the e¤ective spread of CHX or SI is estimated to decrease the corresponding market share by around 3%. The result is intuitive as intermediaries are willing to trade-o¤ lower liquidity for lower total fees -if that liquidity decreases, then we would expect to see a high number of intermediaries switching towards a lower cost venue.
In sum, the results seem to suggest a greater importance of liquidity in comparison with total fees when deciding the venue where to route a given order.
Endogenous Liquidity
Liquidity and fees are clearly not exogenous relatively to each other -one would expect venues to take into consideration liquidity when setting fees, as well as liquidity to be a funtion of the fees schedules. Given the highly endogenous nature of liquidity, a modelling of such outcome is required. Micro-…nance theory implies that liquidity may be potentially a non-linear function of a series of factors that a¤ect both the demand and supply for trading. I follow Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) and introduce a reduceform approach that estimates a liquidity equation as a function of those factors. These include, in line with Stoll (2000) , Wahal (1997) and Weston (2002) , venue market share, share volume, price, and share volatility 4 . In addition demand side estimates were also exploited to include unobserved venue characteristics, computed as follows,
where kvt , and were obtained at the demand estimation stage. Table VII The liquidity equation is instrumental in understanding the impact of total fees on e¤ective spreads as total fees in ‡uence relative market shares which in turn determine venue liquidity. In order to evaluate the total impact impact of fees on spreads, ownand cross-price median elasticities were computed as follows,
where " p vq denotes the cross-total fees elasticity between venues v and q. Table VIII reports the estimated elasticities. 4 Share volatility is de…ned, following Ding and Charoenwong (2003) , as the standard deviation over the average of the quoted mid-point within each time period,
where sd [ ] represents the standard deviation taken over the days included in period t. 5 Log transformation of the volume variable was used to reduce skewness. 
Barriers to Competition
After estimating the degree of substitutability between the di¤erent trading venues, I
address the question of evaluation the barriers to competition induced by the network e¤ects and the post-trading constraints.
Network E¤ects
In order to analyze the impact of network e¤ects as a barrier to competition, I propose to compute the counterfactual market shares that would arise if there were no liquidity di¤erences across venues (although still allowing for heterogeneity across the securities traded). In particular, I considered the case where the e¤ective spread for each securityweek pair is the same across venues and equal to the median of the actual observed spreads. The results -presented in Table IX -suggest that eliminating the liquidity advantage of the incumbent venue contributes to a less asymmetric industry. Chi-X would bene…t less than the SI because of the disadvantage from a post-trading perspective -a point I address in the next sub-section.
Post-Trading Constraints
The competitiveness of a given venue can be penalized by higher post-trading costs. I
propose to evaluate the barriers to competition induced by post-trading constraints by simulating the equilibrium market shares that would arise if the securities traded in the di¤erent trading venues were fungible and intermediaries could choose the post-trading arrangements with the lowest clearing and settlement fees. Being allowed to freely choose post-trading arrangements is equivalent to an e¤ective decrease in the total fees paid by some intermediaries (those that switch from current arrangements).
A decrease in the total fees has a direct impact on relative markets shares and consequently on e¤ective spreads which in turn also in ‡uence market shares. Table X presents the counterfactual results, descriminating the di¤erent e¤ects that would arise.
Conditional on the maintenance of the same level of clearing and settlement fees after eliminating the post-trading constraints, the results suggest that eliminating the post-trading constraints and allowing intermediaries to choose the most competitive post-trading arrangements would also induce less asymmetric industry -of the same order of magnitude as of eliminating the network e¤ect.
CONCLUSION
The Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) aims to increase competition and to foster client protection in the European …nancial market. Among other provisions, it abolishes the concentration rule and challenges the market power of existing trading venues.
The directive introduces venue competition in order to achieve better execution and ultimately lower costs of trading. However, the fostering venue competition may not be enough. In this paper I address the question of whether fostering competition between alternative trading venues alone may or not be able to impact actual competition in the market. I consider two reasons for why it may not: direct network e¤ects and post-trading constraints.
I empirically address the following questions: (a) evaluate the actual degree of competition between trading venues, (b) measure the impact of network e¤ects on competition, and lastly (c) assess the barriers to competition induced by the bundle of trading and post-trading services.
The results imply that …nancial intermediaries tend to value liquidity more (than total fees) when deciding where to route a given order for execution. For this reason the incumbent venue has a clear advantage relatively to its competitors and can, as a result, exert market power when setting fees. Furthermore, eliminating the mentioned barriers to competition seems to be asociated with a signi…cant decrease (of a similar magnitude) in the assymetry of the industry.
It is known that in general competition impacts economic growth via a more e¢ -cient allocation of market resources that contributes to "better economic performance, better prices and better services for consumers and businesses"(Kroes (2007)). This paper argues that fostering potential competition in the cash trading market may not have an impact on the degree of actual competition as both direct network e¤ects and post-trading constraints act as barries to actual competition. The results presented here indicate that policies promoting competition on the post-trading after market is instrumental in boosting the e¤ectiveness of MiFID. 
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